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ECCC in Pre-Trial Action:
Was There Good Reason to Order
Pre-Trial Detention of the ECCC Defendants

By Stan Starygin*
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Introduction

o date, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia (ECCC) has denied all motions for pre-trial
release. On July 31, 2007 the reputed commandant of
the central security prison (S-21) of Democratic Kampuchea
(popularly known as the “Khmer Rouge regime”), Kaing Guek
Iev, was transferred into ECCC custody from the military
prison of Phnom Penh where he had been held without trial for
eight years prior on orders from the Military Tribunal of the
Kingdom of Cambodia (Military Tribunal). The Co-Investigating
Judges (CIJs) promptly ordered Kaing’s pre-trial detention. On
December 3, 2007 the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) denied Kaing’s
appeal.

Co-Lawyers and Nuon Chea sit in Pre-Trial Chamber during his appeal
against provisional detention.

Noun Chea, the Democratic Kampuchea’s alleged Communist
Party of Kampuchea (CPK) Secretary and presumed second in
command to Pol Pot, was the first person arrested directly on
orders by the ECCC. On March 20, 2008 the PTC rejected
Noun’s appeal of a CIJ order for his pre-trial detention. Similarly,
on orders of the ECCC, Ieng Thirith, Democratic Kampuchea’s
Minister of Social Affairs (Action), and Ieng Sary, Democratic
Kampuchea’s Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs were
arrested and ordered to pre-trial detention. The PTC rejected
appeals against pre-trial detention in both cases in decisions on
July 9 and October 17, 2008, respectively.

coercive powers of the State. This paper seeks to examine the
reasons by which the ECCC has substantiated their denials of
appeal against pre-trial detention, and attempts to answer the
question of whether such reasons had a solid legal foundation in
the ECCC’s pre-trial detention test.

The Pre-Trial Detention Test (PTDT)
One manner of restraining the coercive powers of the state
in decisions pertaining to pre-trial detention was to create a
narrowly constructed and construed pre-trial detention test
(PTDT). The Cambodian legislature set out the parameters for
the PTDT by linking the test to Cambodian law, stating that “[t]
he procedure shall be in accordance with Cambodian law,”4 and
that all chambers of the court “shall follow existing procedures
in place.”5 The legislature’s stipulation of the application of
“existing procedure” is unambiguous, and is therefore a direct
reference to the two criminal procedure codes that existed in
2006, the Criminal Procedure Code of the State of Cambodia
(CPCSoC) and the Provisions Relating to the Judiciary and
Criminal Law and Procedure Applicable in Cambodia During
the Transitional Period (UNTAC Code).6 The CPCSoC did not
contain a PTDT and, therefore, the ECCC would have been
limited to the PTDT of the UNTAC Code if the ECCC did not
develop a method of their own. The UNTAC Code stated that a
defendant may be detained pending trial if:

Finally, on November 19, 2007, the ECCC also arrested
Khieu Samphan, who had allegedly held numerous high-level
positions within Democratic Kampuchea. Khieu filed an appeal
with the PTC, which was later withdrawn as part of defense
counsel’s pre-trial strategy, but subsequently filed an additional
appeal requesting his release on the basis of an alleged abuse
of process. Despite Khieu’s appeals, the decision by the CIJs to
detain has stood throughout the process.
On account of the Internal Rules of the ECCC that limit
orders for pre-trial detention to a maximum length of one year
at a time,1 defendants continue to appeal extension of orders for
pre-trial detention without success.2 Operating in an environment of endemic abuse of legal process and abuse3 of the state
power to detain individuals pending trial in particular, the ECCC
has sought to set clear standards of the rule of law and resist the
* Stan Starygin is a Cambodia and international criminal law expert,
amicus curiae for Kaing Guek Iev before the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia, Human Rights Specialist for the United
Nations Development Program, and Director of the Swedish Institute
of Research for Southeast Asia.

(1) there is a risk of escape or non-appearance manifested by the absence of such factors as: (a) a job, (b)
a family, or (c) a home; [or] (2) if there is a reason to
9

Therefore, the ECCC PTDT diverges from the standards promulgated by the Cambodian legislature in a number of important
ways. First, the ECCC PTDT includes a requirement that the
CIJs or the Chamber satisfy themselves with the existence of
the material element of the charge. In essence, the CIJs or the
Chamber (most often PTC) must be able to find that there is
“well-founded reason to believe” that the suspect committed
the offenses alleged by the prosecution. This analysis is to be
done on the basis of, inter alia, the Introductory Submission,
which in simple terms is the untested opinion of the prosecution on the guilt of the suspect.11 As such, it is not difficult to
predict that the PTC will inexorably find itself satisfied with
the existence of “well-founded reason to believe,” as it neither
has the independent capacity to test what is proffered by the
prosecution, nor a mandate to undertake such a task. Second,
a far larger amount of implicitly permitted judicial discretion,
particularly compared to that permitted by the UNTAC PTDT,
brought about by the non-existence
of elements of the test discussed
earlier. Third, a shift of the burden
of proof from the prosecution to the
suspect/accused as evidenced in the
pronouncement that the CIJs must
consider it to be “a [mere] necessary measure,” rather than that of “a
reason to believe” enshrined in the
UNTAC PTDT. Fourth, the exclusion of the phrase “stop the offense
or prevent the offense from happening again” from the ECCC PTDT.
This is likely to have been done
due to a belief that the possibility
of recidivism within the jurisdiction
of the ECCC by suspects/accused
individuals is extremely remote at
present.

believe that the accused will influence witnesses or the
conduct of the investigation if released.7
There are two attributes of the UNTAC PTDT that are of
particular relevance to rights of the accused: (1) it eliminates
judicial discretion by spelling out specific factors which may
result in a non-appearance; and (2) it places the burden of proving that there is “a reason to believe” the accused will interfere
with the administration of justice if released on the prosecution.
The ECCC chose to disregard this PTDT, even though this was
the only source of law that fully complied with the legislature’s
command at the time of the ECCC’s inception.
Instead, the ECCC looked to the Criminal Procedure Code of
the Kingdom of Cambodia (CPC KoC) Bill, which at the time of
inception of the Chambers, in 2006, was expected to imminently
become law (and which did so in August 2007).8 The standard
for pre-trial detention contained in the CPC KoC included six
components:
(1) guarantee the presence of
the accused during the proceedings against him; (2) prevent
any harassment of witnesses or
victims or prevent any collusion between the accused and
his accomplices; (3) stop the
offense or prevent the offense
from happening again; (4) preserve evidence and exhibits; (5)
protect security of the accused;
(6) preserve public order from
any disturbance caused by the
offense.9

[I]t was critical that
the ECCC set clear
standards of the rule
of law and restraint of
the relevant coercive
powers of the State.

This standard differs from the
UNTAC PTDT in two important
aspects: (1) it creates room for judicial discretion by the non-inclusion of elements in any of its
prongs; and (2) at least in some instances, it visibly places the
burden of proof on the accused. The ECCC did not accept the
CPC KoC PTDT in its entirety in the form envisioned by the legislature and elected to introduce changes that resulted in the following PTDT within article 63(3) of the ECCC Internal Rules:

ECCC’s Application of the Pre-trial Detention Test
The following analysis will be a composite of the positions
of the prosecution and the defense regarding the interpretation
of the individual prongs of the ECCC PTDT, and the orders and
decisions regarding the application of the same handed down by
the CIJs and the PTC, respectively. By the time of this writing,12
the CIJs, the PTC, and the Trial Chamber (TC) have applied the
ECCC’s PTDT to all five suspects currently before their respective Chambers.13

(a) there is well-founded reason to believe that the person may have committed the crime or crimes specified
in the Introductory or Supplementary Submission; and
(b) the Co-Investigating Judges consider Provisional
Detention to be a necessary measure to:

It is important to note that the ECCC PTDT was designed
as a conjunctive test. Both prongs, the “well-founded reason
to believe” and the “necessary measure” must be satisfied.14
Considering that the “well-founded” prong appears first in the
text of the PTDT, there is an implicit imperative that it be satisfied first, the failure of which renders the argument for pre-trial
detention fatal (regardless of the meritorious strength of the
facts adduced to satisfy the elements of the “necessary measure”
prong). A detailed discussion of both prongs of the test and the
ECCC’s application of them will follow.

(i) prevent the charged person from exerting pressure on any witnesses or victims, or prevent any
collusion between the charged person and accomplices of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of
the ECCC;
(ii) preserve evidence or prevent the destruction
of any evidence; (iii) ensure the presence of the
charged person during the proceedings;
(iv) protect the security of the charged person;
(v) preserve public order.10
10

The first organ of the court to apply the ECCC PTDT is the
CIJs. Despite the requirement that each Provisional Detention
Order must contain a “Reasons/Grounds for the Decision,”15 the
CIJs have not provided reasoning for their findings of a wellfounded reason to believe that the accused may have committed
the alleged crimes.16 Instead, in each case, the CIJs agreed with
the prosecution without re-stating the prosecution’s arguments
(with the exception of the order to provisionally detain Khieu, in
which the CIJs went into some detail on this matter).17
Defense teams have responded by criticizing the CIJs for
what they perceive as reaching decisions based on not “anything
more than a very cursory review of the case file”18 and failing
to exercise “particular diligence.”19 Further in the process, some
of the defense teams conceded (at least to a certain degree) to
the existence of “well-founded reason” in the contexts of their
clients’ cases,20 but continued to criticize the CIJs for the initial
lack of reasoned arguments.21 On request, the CIJs refused to
elaborate on the reasons for their satisfaction of the “wellfounded” prong and proceeded to re-iterate their essential agreement with the sufficient volume of evidence adduced by the
prosecution through the Introductory Submissions. It appears
that there is a growing consensus among the defense teams that
it is the CIJs’ diligence in testing the “well-founded” prong that
has been called into question. This view is accordant with the
simple mathematics involved in the CIJ’s review, which betrays
the CIJs’ intention to create an impression of having been able
to canvass a large number of documents of the Introductory
Submission in a very short period of time, denying it the plausibility of an independent observer.22

Photo courtesy of the ECCC.

Well-Founded Reason to Believe that a Person May
Have Committed the Crime or Crimes Specified in the
Introductory or Supplementary Submission

Former Democratic Kampuchea foreign minister Ieng Sary stands for
the first time in the Pre-Trial Chamber 30 June, 2008 with public in the
background.

The Co-Investigating Judges Consider Provisional
Detention to be a Necessary Measure
As previously noted, an analysis of this prong – or any of its
elements – can only be undertaken if the decision-making organ
of the court is satisfied with the existence of the conditions of
the “well-founded” prong. The five elements of the “necessary
measure” prong are disjunctive (which is evinced through the
conjunction ‘or’ between the final two elements) with only one
being necessary to satisfy the conditions of the entire prong. It is
equally salient to note that the burden of proving the existence of
the conditions of each or any of the elements of the “necessary
measure” prong rests upon the CIJs.
(i) [P]revent the Charged Person from exerting pressure on any witnesses or Victims, or prevent any collusion between the Charged Person and accomplices
of crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the ECCC;
(ii) preserve evidence or prevent the destruction of any
evidence29

Moving from the CIJs to the PTC, the PTC addressed whether
well-founded reason to believe the accused was responsible for
the alleged criminal activity where doing so was warranted by
the facts of the case.23 In instances where the PTC has addressed
the substantive basis of the “well-founded” prong, the PTC juxtaposed the definition of the prong in French law with that in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)
to find that the standard of proof is lower at the pre-trial level
than it might be at more advanced stages of the proceedings.24
Like the CIJs, the PTC has also not set forth a clear explanation
of the application of the “well-founded” prong, but instead has
declared itself satisfied that the conditions of the test have been
met without conducting the necessary evidentiary analysis.25
In addition, considering the fact that the PTC applied the same
prong to each of the five suspects, the PTC used widely differing
means for determining whether the conditions of the prong had
been met without any articulated reasoning, and arguably used
different conditions as the substance of the prong.26

CIJs did not follow the ECCC PTDT in a sequential manner.
A simple comparative analysis of the initial detention orders
issued by the CIJs will demonstrate that the CIJs’ reasoning
cannot be described by an objective observer as hewn to the
PTDT. In some orders the CIJs failed to discuss the above elements,30 while in others they expanded on the circumstances
spelled out in the elements without adducing any evidence to
support their assertions.31 Yet in others, the CIJs stretched the
PTDT to create a de facto bar to pre-trial release based on the
rights to confrontation and access to the case file (the exercise of
these rights by the suspects, in the opinion of the CIJs, provided
material evidence to demonstrate the existence of the “pressure”
sub-element of this element).32 Instead of adducing evidence
to determine whether the circumstances of this element were
met, the CIJs often merely re-stated the sub-elements of this
element. This practice demonstrates a lack of understanding of
the fact that the purpose of the PTDT is to test arguments for
pre-trial detention put forward by the prosecution, not to serve
as a list for the CIJs to pick more fitting reasons for detention.
Although the CIJs have begun to undertake somewhat more
in-depth analysis of the PTDT following scathing remarks from
the defense regarding the CIJs’ performance,33 the format of the
CIJs’ reasoning remains the same.34

In Prosecutor v. Noun et al, the TC’s judgment reads as an
opinion written in much haste and without a thorough review of
the CIJs’ Closing Order. The TC declared itself satisfied with
the existence of prima facie evidence to meet the requirements
of the “well-founded” prong27 in relation to the three accused,28
but did not substantiate this finding beyond its recognition of
the Closing Order and the PTC’s confirmation of such a finding.
11

The lack of any evidence-based arguments in the decisions
issued by the CIJs with respect to the “pressure + collusion +
destruction” element made them an easy target for the defense.
Citing other international tribunals, the defense inveighed against
the CIJs’ treatment of this element on the following grounds: (1)
the risks must be based on specific facts, not abstract perception
of the prevailing situation; (2) unsubstantiated claims based on
general assertions must be rejected; (3) the fact that the suspect
may retain some level of influence does not automatically presume that s/he will use it unlawfully (i.e. to attempt to intimidate
witnesses and destroy evidence).35 The defense teams, however,
compromised their credibility – and thus their ability to drive
strong and valid arguments through to their completion – before
the Chambers by
committing blatant
errors of legal reasoning.36 However,
these errors can be
seen as examples of
zealous advocacy
clouding
defense
counsel’s judgment,
and may raise issues
substantiated by little
evidence or procedural weight.37

CIJs, the PTC appeared to have had no difficulty following the
ECCC PTDT and did so by addressing each of its elements
through the statutorily ordered sequence.42 Substantively, the
PTC introduced at least three de facto bars to pre-trial release
relevant to this element that do not appear in the CIJs’ detention orders (“mere presence,” “weapons easily accessible,” and
“very few witnesses”) which are insurmountable to the accused
because they pertain to external circumstances, imaginary or
real, as opposed to the character of the accused. In all other
aspects, the PTC agreed with the CIJs, including the most blatant abuse of the rights of the accused: converting the accused’s
rights to confrontation and access to the file into a de facto bar
to pre-trial release.43 The TC rejected all of the prosecution’s
arguments – and by
extension, the arguments of the CIJs
and PTC where they
were in agreement
with the prosecution
– relating to the existence of conditions
sufficient to satisfy
the “pressure + collusion + destruction”
element of the ECCC
PTDT for “lack of
substantiation.” 44
The TC found the
lack of substantiation to be a fatal flaw
of the prosecution’s
arguments for “the
above
reasons” 45
which the TC never
enunciated either
above or below.

Despite the requirement that
each Provisional Detention Order
must contain a ‘Reasons/Grounds
for the Decision,’ the CIJs have
not provided reasoning for their
findings of a well-founded reason to
believe that the accused may have
committed the alleged crimes.

Appeals based
on matters of disagreement between
the defense and the
CIJs provided the
PTC with its first
opportunity to offer
its judicial review on
the manner in which
the “pressure + collusion + destruction” element was intended to be satisfied. The
PTC began this process by averring that essentially the suspect’s
present situation (absence of a position of authority, absence
of resources, etc.) is of no consequence, but that the suspect’s
“mere presence” in society and the PTC’s finding that “weapons
[were] easily accessible” would intimidate witnesses. According
to the PTC, “there are very few remaining witnesses who can
testify to the Charged person’s involvement in the alleged
crimes,” and therefore they should employ all necessary means
to protect witnesses. While the “mere presence” argument is
not that of the PTC’s invention,38 the PTC introduced it into the
context of the ECCC without a comparative analysis of the very
different circumstances of the other international criminal tribunals (ICTs) vis-à-vis the ECCC. The PTC explained their “mere
presence” argument through the existence of “a ubiquitous feeling of fear.”39

(iii) [E]nsure the presence of the Charged person during the proceedings
As was pointed out to be the case with the “pressure +
collusion + destruction” element, the CIJs’ application of the
“presence” element lacked adherence to the ECCC PTDT. This
is instantiated in the CIJs’ different treatment of very similarly
situated persons.46 While other arguments had been advanced
(residence abroad, financial means, absence of an extradition treaty between Cambodia and certain countries, general
negative attitude towards the ECCC, and disappearance from
the public view47), the cornerstone of the CIJs’ argument for the
existence of the conditions of the “presence” element was in the
CIJs’ opinion that the projected length of imprisonment would
induce the suspects to flee the ECCC process.48 In some cases,
the defense responded to this argument by asserting that the
CIJs failed to adduce evidence to support its assertions that the
suspects were a flight risk.49 The PTC essentially accepted the
arguments advanced by the CIJs and added a substantial number
of its own arguments, such as the likelihood of the accused’s
“disappearance from public view,”50 and “the situation is no longer the same now that he is under investigation of the ECCC,”51
however the “projected length of imprisonment” remained the
cornerstone of the PTC’s argument.

Thus, similar to the CIJs, in most cases the PTC failed to
adduce any evidence to support their declarations of satisfaction
with the presence of evidence of the “pressure + collusion +
destruction” element.40 The PTC often treated this requirement
under the single sub-element of “pressure,” while not addressing
the sub-element of “collusion,” and by lumping “destruction”
with “pressure.”41 However, it should be noted that unlike the
12

The TC similarly found that circumstances existed to satisfy
the requirements of the “presence” element, but rejected all of
the arguments of the prosecution – and by proxy the arguments
previously advanced by the CIJs and the PTC when they were
in agreement with the prosecution – advanced at the hearing on
January 31, 2011. The one exception pertained to the “projected
length of imprisonment”52 argument, which was buttressed by
an argument the TC advanced regarding “detailed information
regarding viable alternatives.”53 As with the CIJs and PTC, the
TC failed to provide a factual basis to support the “projected
length of imprisonment” argument and provide reasons that justified the argument’s application to the accused with no regard
for their personal circumstances and character. Instead, the TC
shifted the burden of proving that the accused would appear for
trial to the defense by creating an expectation that the defense
would provide “viable alternatives” to detention.

disagreed with the CIJs – and by extension with the prosecution
– in a groundbreaking statement that it was not satisfied with
the existence of the circumstances of the “ensure the security”
element due to the fact that it found “no evidence in the Case
File” nor “[had] any been submitted by the Co-Prosecutors.”58
This disagreement helped create a perception that while the
ECCC continued to maintain the principle that “detention must
be the rule,” and “pre-trial release the exception,” the PTC began
undertaking meaningful review of the CIJs’ orders. Laudable as
this departure was, the PTC continued to be mired in abstractions that it repeatedly adduced to its findings relevant to the
“ensure the security” element.59
The TC rejected the arguments of the prosecution – and by
extension, those of the CIJs and the PTC, where they were in
agreement with the prosecution – regarding the “ensure the
security” element by stating that the prosecution’s arguments

The Trial Court’s approach therefore does not
demonstrate a change in quality but merely replaces
the defense with the prosecution as the party at a
disadvantage, since the prosecution will find it
difficult to appeal the TC’s decision due to the
same exact reasons the defense had difficulty
appealing decisions of the CIJs and the PTC.
were untenable for “lack of substantiation.”60 The TC made this
determination on the basis of “the above reasons” which it did
not enunciate either above or below.61

(iv) [P]rotect the security of the Charged person
In the cases of the five accused individuals who have faced
pre-trial detention, the CIJs did not offer any factual basis
for finding the existence of the conditions of the “protect the
security” element. Instead, the CIJs offered unsubstantiated
(there appears to be no academic literature to attest to the CIJs’
claims; nor did the CIJs commission their own study of such)
abstractions such as that of “the gravity of [crimes] which . . .
still profoundly disrupt public order,” “fragile context of today’s
Cambodian society,” and “risks of indignation which could lead
to violence,” and “the situation [not being] the same now that the
official prosecution has commenced.”54

(v) [P]reserve public order
The “public order” element is the most ambiguous of the
ECCC PTDT elements. A reasonable observer would expect
proof of the possibility of violent public reaction to the release
of the suspect. The CIJs offered no such proof in any of the
five cases, and unceremoniously hid behind such proffered
abstractions as the “gravity of [crimes] [capable] of profoundly
disrupt[ing] the public order,” “the fragile context of today’s
Cambodian society,” and “indignation which could lead to
violence.”62 The defense appealed against the one-size-fitsall approach of the CIJs and the lack of a factual basis in the
CIJs’ reasoning. The defense referred to the CIJs reasoning as
“impermissible and spurious”63 and made specific references to
the international jurisprudence that required evidence of a possibility of disruption of the public order and a finding that this
possibility decreases over time.64

The defense teams responded to the abstractions, with some
calling them “legally impermissible and factually spurious.”55
Others restated their claim that, similar to the treatment of the
other elements of the PTDT by the CIJs, the treatment of the
“ensure the security” element lacks a factual basis.56
The PTC approached the appeals of detention orders in all
five cases with what appears to be an intention to ground their
findings in facts. It did so where reasonably adducible facts were
available.57 Where adducible facts were not available, the PTC

In deciding appeals relevant to the “public order” element,
the PTC relied on the establishment of certain historical facts
13

The TC rejected the arguments of the prosecution – and by
extension those of the CIJs and the PTC where they were in
agreement with the prosecution – regarding the “public order”
element by stating that the prosecution’s arguments were untenable for “lack of substantiation.”70 The TC reached this conclusion on the basis of “the above reasons” which it did not enunciate either above or below.71

Photo courtesy of the ECCC.

to justify its conclusion. For example, the PTC concluded that
“1.7 million Cambodians died”65 during the stewardship of
Democratic Kampuchea. This is not an uncontested number.66
The PTC also offered its expertise in medical sciences, asserting that a portion of the population that lived through the period
from 1975 to 1979 suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD). Moreover, the PTC claimed that PTSD would be reactivated if the suspects were to be released pending trial.67 The
PTC managed to arrive at this conclusion without as much as
summoning a single medical expert before it. Again, the PTC
used abstractions such as the “great public interest in the proceedings,”68 and “the grave nature of the crimes,” and the PTC’s
perception of relevance of the anti-Thai riots in Cambodia in
2003 as a way of projecting what might happen.69

Court Building for the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia.

Underneath these convoluted matters of criminal procedure
are the rights of individuals. Although the individuals whose
plight in pre-trial detention awaiting trial in the ECCC do not
often evoke an outpouring of local or international empathy,
they too like anyone interfacing with the criminal process, have
the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a court
of law and have the right to have the necessity of their pre-trial
detention determined by the court on the basis of a standard
specified by statute in the pre-trial detention test.

Conclusion
The CIJs have misapplied the ECCC PTDT by breaking
the statutory sequence of the test and by advancing arguments
without explaining their evidentiary support. The shortcomings
of the determination of the CIJs negatively affected the PTC, by
forcing the PTC to go beyond the detention orders to address the
issues raised by the defense on appeal. The format of the TC’s
most recent intervention to rectify what it sees as the mistakes
of other decision-making organs of the court (CIJs and PTC)
entailed reinstating the rights of the accused and granting the
accused relief for the previous mistakes of law. However, similar
to the CIJs and PTC, the TC lacks substantiation and betrays the
hastiness with which the TC handed down its decision. The TC’s
approach therefore does not demonstrate a change in quality, but
merely replaces the defense with the prosecution as the party at a
disadvantage since the prosecution will find it difficult to appeal
the TC’s decision due to the same exact reasons the defense had
difficulty appealing decisions of the CIJs and the PTC – absence
of factual basis.

The tide may be turning. On February 16, 2011, the TC
invalidated all of the prosecution’s arguments for the existence
of conditions to satisfy all but one of the elements of prong
two of the ECCC PTDT. By doing so, the TC implicitly invited
the defense to proffer “viable alternatives” to detention72 and
suspended the requirement to “establish a change in circumstances”73 (on which the prosecution has heavily relied) in
subsequent motions for provisional release by the defense. The
overall tone of the TC’s decision of February 16, 2011, indicates
that the TC would be amenable to ordering provisional release
if the defense managed to proffer “viable alternatives” to allay
the TC’s concerns of the risk of flight. This marks the first real
opportunity for provisional release of any individual accused by
the CIJs since the establishment of the ECCC. HRB

Endnotes: Was There Good Reason to Order Pre-trial Detention of the ECCC Defendants
1

Kampuchea ECCC Agreement (ECCC Agreement), art. 12. It is
incontrovertible that the legislature’s combined use of the terms
“Cambodian law” and “existing procedures in place” excludes any
possibility of encompassing judge-created rules (e.g. ECCC Internal
Rules) for the following reasons: (1) starting 1998 and throughout
the Cambodian government consistently maintained a position that
the ECCC would be “a national court with international participation” (Hun Sen’s Interview with Kyodo News (1999) available at
http://www.cnv.org.kh/cnv_html_pdf/CNV20.PDF; Statement from
the Royal Government of Cambodia In Response to the Announcement of UN Pullout from Negotiations on Khmer Rouge Trial

ECCC Internal Rules, R. 63/6/a.b.
On January 13, 2011, for example, the PTC rejected another
motion for pre-trial release with a promise (rather than a handingdown) of a reasoned decision.
3
See recognition of the endemic problems with the Cambodian
judiciary in a study which paved the way to the establishment of the
ECCC: Group of Experts’ Report to the Secretary General (Report
of the Group of Experts for Cambodia Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution, G.A. Res. 52/135 ¶¶ 102-111, U.N. Doc.
A/53/850), U.N. Doc S/1999/231 (1999) at 47-48.
4
The Agreement between the United Nations and the Royal
Government of Cambodia Concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed During the Period of Democratic
2

Endnotes continued on page 74
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